JERUSALEM, Jan 10 (Reuters) - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an interview published on Friday that he hopes to "taper off" Israeli dependence on U.S. military aid in the next decade.
Netanyahu has said Israel should not be reliant on foreign military aid but has stopped short of declaring a firm timeline for when Israel would be fully independent from Washington.
"I want to taper off the military within the next 10 years," Netanyahu told the Economist. Asked if that meant a tapering "down to zero," he said: "Yes."
Netanyahu said he told President Donald Trump during a recent visit that Israel "very deeply" appreciates "the military aid that America has given us over the years, but here too we've come of age and we've developed incredible capacities."
In December, Netanyahu said Israel would spend 350 billion shekels ($110 billion) on developing an independent arms industry to reduce dependency on other countries.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a memorandum of understanding for the 10 years through September 2028 that provides $38 billion in military aid, $33 billion in grants to buy military equipment and $5 billion for missile defence systems.
Israeli defence exports rose 13% last year, with major contracts signed for Israeli defence technology including its advanced multi-layered aerial defence systems.
U.S. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a staunch Israel supporter and close ally of Trump, said on X that "we need not wait ten years" to begin scaling back military aid to Israel.
"The billions in taxpayer dollars that would be saved by expediting the termination of military aid to Israel will and should be plowed back into the U.S. military," Graham said. "I will be presenting a proposal to Israel and the Trump administration to dramatically expedite the timetable." [SOURCE]
Published Jun 3, 2026, 5:00 AM EDT
https://www.military.com/topics/national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa
Critics warn that Section 224 could deepen both countries' military ties, which may be difficult to reverse.
A provision tucked into the House Armed Services Committee’s draft version of the Fiscal Year 2027 defense policy bill could move the U.S.-Israel military relationship beyond traditional aid and into a far deeper form of defense-industrial integration.
Section 224 of the drafted National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” would require the defense secretary to designate an executive agent to coordinate U.S.-Israel defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation. It specifically describes the provision as covering bilateral defense technology work, integration and industrial cooperation.
Supporters view the proposal as a way to strengthen cooperation between two longtime security partners while critics argue it would move the relationship beyond traditional military aid and into a far deeper system of defense-industrial integration that would be harder for Congress, taxpayers, and even future administrations, to monitor or unwind. The U.S. and Israel jointly struck Iran on Feb. 28, leading to the ongoing war in the Middle East that has enveloped multiple nations.
Ben Freeman, director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute, warned in Responsible Statecraft that “Congress quietly moves to integrate US and Israeli militaries," adding that the measure could intertwine the two countries’ military sectors at a level not previously seen in any U.S. allyship.
Freeman told Military.com that the provision reaches across “seemingly every area of defense tech,” including artificial intelligence, quantum technology, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber and biotechnology. He said the most alarming terms were “network integration” and “data fusion,” since the bill does not clearly define them.
Ben Freeman is director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute.
The proposal also arrives as senior American and Israeli officials increasingly discuss moving beyond the traditional aid framework. On June 1, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee wrote on X that a future U.S.-Israel security agreement would move away from direct aid, stating, “New MOU w/ Israel ends aid & will be based on trade.”
The statement echoed previous comments from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials advocating a gradual transition away from direct military assistance and toward joint projects and defense cooperation.
Freeman argues that this shift is not simply a change in accounting. It represents a fundamental change in how the relationship operates.
'Sky is the Limit'
The United States and Israel currently operate under a 10-year memorandum of understanding that runs from fiscal 2019 through FY 2028 and provides $3.3 billion per year in foreign military financing, plus $500 million per year for missile defense cooperation.
That aid model has long been controversial, but it is at least visible. Congress can debate it, lawmakers can try to condition it, and the public can understand the top-line number.
Freeman argued that Section 224 points toward something different: Moving support out of the foreign-aid framework and into Pentagon procurement, licensing, co-production and research channels.
That shift matches a broader debate described by Steven Simon in a Quincy Institute brief, “The Disappearing Aid Check,” which argues ending traditional grant aid would not necessarily end U.S. support for Israel’s military. Instead, support could move into procurement contracts, joint development programs, sustainment pipelines and industrial-based investments.
Reserve and Guard leaders speak with 25 HASC staff members to outline readiness challenges and legislative priorities, aiming to inform work on the upcoming national defense bill at the Rayburn House Office Building. (DVIDS)
Freeman said that matters because the new model would be harder for ordinary Americans to see or influence. Aid is capped by a memorandum of understanding and publicly appropriated, but procurement and industrial cooperation can expand through numerous contracts, programs and partnerships spread across different parts of the Defense Department.
Under the aid model, he said, a voter who objects to Israeli military actions can call a member of Congress and demand a vote against aid. But under the procurement model, “You have no one to call."
"You basically have to call up the Department of Defense and say, ‘Hello, Pete Hegseth, please stop doing business with Israel,'" he said.
The transparency concern is sharpened by the Pentagon’s own accounting problems. The Defense Department completed its seventh consecutive department-wide financial statement audit in 2024 without receiving a clean opinion, while stating that it aims to achieve an unmodified audit opinion by the end of 2028.
Freeman said that if U.S. support for Israel is spread across contracts, data-sharing arrangements, licensing agreements and joint ventures, “There is no upper bound for the level of cooperation here."
“The sky is the limit," he said. "It would be all but impossible to come up with a full estimate of exactly how much U.S. money is going to Israel.”
Data Fusion and Intelligence Risks
Perhaps the most controversial language in Section 224 involves “network integration” and “data fusion.” The legislation does not clearly define either term. Freeman said that ambiguity is exactly what concerns him.
“I take it as meaning the U.S. military's data could soon be the Israeli military's data,” he said, adding that his concern is rooted in previous disputes over technology-sharing.
In 2020, the U.S. Army acquired two Israeli-made Iron Dome batteries. However, Army officials later concluded that the system could not be fully integrated into the Army's broader air and missile defense architecture.
After providing the equipment, Israel was unwilling to provide source code and technical information necessary for full integration. The Army ultimately decided not to pursue additional Iron Dome purchases.
To Freeman, that history raises an obvious question. If Israel previously resisted sharing critical technical information with the United States, what guarantees exist that future data-sharing arrangements would be fully reciprocal?
The Jobs Trap
Freeman believes the most politically significant aspect of Section 224 may have nothing to do with technology. Instead, he points to jobs.
Section 224 could encourage Israeli-linked defense firms to expand co-production facilities, joint ventures and manufacturing work inside the United States. Once those jobs exist, they become political assets.
Freeman called that possibility “the real Trojan horse” in the proposal. He argued that Israeli firms could replicate the familiar American defense-industry strategy of spreading production across congressional districts, making lawmakers reluctant to oppose programs that support local employment.
Former Vice President Mike Pence speaks at the the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 2020 Conference, Monday, March 2, 2020 in Washington. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
The F-35 program offers the clearest example of how that works. Lockheed Martin spread suppliers and jobs across dozens of states, helping create political support that makes the program extraordinarily difficult to cancel.
Freeman compared that dynamic to what could happen if Israeli defense firms build deeper U.S. manufacturing footprints.
“They would put that on top of what is already, arguably, the most powerful special interest in all of U.S. politics,” he said. “It would put the Israel lobby on steroids.”
The issue is not hypothetical. Recent reporting has already identified Israeli-linked defense manufacturing and drone production inside the United States, including facilities connected to companies such as XTEND.
Hard to Unwind
Freeman points to Turkey's removal from the F-35 program as an example of how difficult defense-industrial disentanglement can be.
After Ankara was expelled from the program over its purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense system, the Pentagon spent years shifting production away from Turkish suppliers that had been manufacturing hundreds of F-35 components. The transition required finding and qualifying replacement suppliers, restructuring portions of the supply chain, and absorbing additional costs before Turkey could be fully removed from the program.
That was one program. Section 224 would potentially touch multiple domains at once.
Freeman argued that if Israel later took actions that caused Washington to reconsider the relationship, disentangling the two defense sectors could take years and create real national security costs.
A Dangerous Time to Integrate
Recent Middle East diplomacy shows why deeper integration is risky.
President Donald Trump said Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to reduce hostilities, but Netanyahu said Israel would continue “to operate as planned” in southern Lebanon unless Hezbollah stopped its attacks. Trump reportedly lashed out at Netanyahu, calling him "crazy," according to Axios.
Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a ceremony commemorating Israel's Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers, or Yom HaZikaron, at the Military Cemetery on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, Tuesday April 21, 2026. (Ilia Yefimovich/Pool Photo via AP)
Iran then halted communications with mediators, according to Iranian reports, while Trump said talks were continuing.
To Freeman, the episode proves that U.S. and Israeli interests are not always compatible.
“Netanyahu is proving right now that Israel’s interests are not always America’s interests,” he said. “Trump is trying to negotiate an end to this conflict, and Netanyahu—over and over again—is doing things that violate the ceasefires and make ending the conflict impossible.”
A Shift in Public Opinion
That concern comes as public opinion has shifted sharply on Israel.
Gallup reported in February 2026 that Israelis no longer lead Palestinians in Americans’ sympathies, with independent-leaning voters now sympathizing more with Palestinians than Israelis.
In May 2026, an Institute for Global Affairs poll found that only 16% of Americans want the United States to keep supplying Israel with weapons without new restrictions, while 38% want weapons transfers stopped entirely and 24% want them conditioned on how they are used. Among Republicans, 35% back unrestricted supply, 29% want conditions, and 18% want to halt supply entirely.
On the other hand, some lawmakers have pushed institutional links beyond procurement. In 2024, H.R. 8445 proposed extending certain protections under federal law to U.S. citizens serving in the Israel Defense Forces.
Freeman said he has seen bipartisan concern about Section 224, including interest from figures on the right and left.
His plea to Congress was direct: “The American people don’t want it. Listen to your constituents, not your lobbyists. Strip out Section 224 from the NDAA.” [SOURCE]
